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STATE OF UTAH,

)

Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

j
)

FEDERICO PEREZ,

case Xo. 910349

)

Defendant/Appellant

)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
I JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant
to Section (Title) 78-2-2 Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended.
II ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Was defendant in custody or had he been restrained in

any way or unreasonably detained by the officer at the time the
consent to search was given?
2.

Did the State sustain the burden of proving that the

consent to search was voluntary and valid?
3.

Did the search of the vehicle exceed the scope of the

consent given?
4.

Were defendants rights against unreasonable search and

seizure as guaranteed by the fourth amendment of the United

States Constitution and Article 1, Section 14 of the Utah State
Constitution violated by the officer's detention and search of
defendant's vehicle?
The standard for review is that a trial court's finding
should be set aside if it is clearly erroneous or if i; is not
supported by substantial competent evidence. - Rules of Civ.
Proc . , Rule 5 2 (a ) .
III.

STATEMENT OF CASE

Defendant/appellant is a Mexican national 22 years of age at
the time of arrest with a limited ability to speak and understand
the English language.

His scholastic education was just four years

and he had lived in the United States four years.
About 4:00 p.m. on February 27, 1991 defendant had stopped the
pick-up he was driving near mile post 15 on Interstate 15 in
Washington County to check the brakes.

The vehicle had Nebraska

plates, was registered in the State of Nebraska and belonged to
defendant's brother who lived in Nebraska.
Utah Highway Patrolman Kevin Davis observed the stopped vehicle and approached to see if any help was needed.

Officer Davis

noticed that the side windows were tinted in excess of what Utah
law allows and asked defendant for his driver's license and vecie registration.

When the door was opened to give the license

and registration to the officer he detected an odor of air fresheners and saw several of them inside the pick-up.

The officer

noticed that the last name on the registration was different from
defendant's and was told that the pick-up belonged to a brother.
-2-

Officer Davis took the license and registration to his vehicle, had his dispatcher run a check to see if the pick-up was
stolen and prepared a warning notice for the tinted windows.
While giving the warning notice, registration and license to
defendant Officer Davis noticed several fast food containers
(empty soft drink containers and a sack from a restaurant) and
a welded section in the bed of the pick-up.

Officer Davis asked

defendant if he was carrying any guns, knives, alcohol, illegal
contraband or anything like that in his vehicle and,receiving a
response of "no" asKed defendant if he could search the vehicle.
Officer Davis checked the welded section in the bed of the
pick-up and satisfied himself that it was indeed a repair that
could not have been made from the outside of the pick-up.

He

then requested to search the cab and asked the defendant and his
passenger to stand off the side of the road at the rear of the
pick-up.

While searcnmg the cab

another officer, Jim Lloyd,

arrived and, without speaking to defendant or getting his permission to search, assisted officer Davis in the search.

By

removing a little plastic cylindrical-shaped object from the
stereo speaker the officers could see something hidden inside
the speaker and with trooper Davis' screwdriver they opened up
the speaker and found a small plastic bag containing approximately 700 grams of purportedly cocaine.
Defendant and passenger Pedro Mandoza-Mares were arrested

and transported to the Washington County Jail where they were
booked and subsequently charged with possession of a controlled
substance with intent to distribute.

A suppression of evidence

hearing was held May 17, and 23, 1991 before the Honorable Hon.
J. Philip Eves, District Judge, and defendant's motion to suppress evidence was denied.

Charges were dismissed against the

passenger and defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty and
on July 10, 1991 was sentenced to a term of five years to life
in the Utah State Prison.
IV.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Fact 1.

While appellant was stopped to check vehicle's

brakes officer Davis approached to offer help and noticed tinted
side windows in excess of what Utah's law allows.
Fact 2.

While obtaining driver's license and vehicle reg-

istration from defendant, officer Davis detected an odor of air
fresheners and observed several air fresheners in the cab.
Fact 3.

After checking with dispatcher to determine if

pick-up was reported stolen, officer Davis returned the license
and registration and gave him a warning notice for tinted windows.

While doing so he noticed empty fast food containers

and

a re-welded section in the bed of the pick-up.
Fact 4.

Until officer Davis asked defendant for his driver's

license and vehicle registration he had seen no evidence of any
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Fact ~ .
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criminal

ii: fresh-

activity.

f h 1 " "lit rcemen' .icticri officer

detain aerenaant
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ing and to request permission to search tne venicle.
Fact S .

Officer

Itsvi

,
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M'ficet

Lloyd w ^
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not ia\c attendant 's permission to search, made a aetailet search
of tne venicle and Dy aismaritling
baa containing a h m r
Fact 9.

7n"'' train-

Appellant

J speaker discovered
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ana his passenger were arrestee, taken

to the Washington County Jail, booked and charged v itn to?session
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
the1 wnvunc' notice

The detention of appellant after receiving

for tintea windows n \ order for officer Davis to ask what ne was
carrying m

the picK-up and to request permission

tne suDseouent

to searcn and

searcn was an unlawful seizure and s e a m ;

vioiatea aef^nnnn 4

i , m t s guaranteed

hv the

tourth amendment

of the Unitet States Constitution and Article 1,
the Utah Constitution.

„mcn

Section 14 of

Officer Davis had no articulable suspicion nor reasonable
basis to ask what defendant was carrying in his pick-up or to
request permission to search same.

The consent to search obtained

by officer Davis was not voluntarily given nor free from duress
and/or coercion.

It was obtained through the exploitation of the

illegal and unjustified detainment by officer Davis of defendant.
Findings No.'s 3 and 6 of the trial court are not supported
by the evidence.

Finding No. 3 states:

" That the defendant was not in custody nor had
he been restrained in any way or unreasonably
detained by the officer at the time the consent
was given."
Finding No. 6 states:
"That the defendant understood the officer when
he requested permission to search the vehicle,
and consent was knowingly and voluntarily given."
Even if the State could show some evidentiary support for
Finding No. 6, it did not address nor try to show that the consent was not obtained through the exploitation of the officer's
unlawful detainment of defendant.

Only a valid consent given

by the defendant would waive his protected rights under the
fourth amendment of the United States Constitution.
VI. ARGUMENT
Appellant was seized and searched without a warrant in violation of his rights guaranteed by the fourth amenc.nent of the
United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 14 of the Utah
Constitution.

After checking defendant's license, running a

computer check for stolen vehicles and issuing a warning notice
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for tinted windows, officer Davis further detained defendant by
asking I iim if he had any guns, alcohol, illegal contraband or
a i 1 y 11 1 i i i g J i 1 : e t h a t a i i. d
permission

to searcn

Officer
ih' WM.„ qive!

i i p o i :;i i: e c e i v i n g a n e g a t i v e a n s v e r r e q u e s t e d

the. v e h i c l e .

Davis stated

that

( H n q . [r.

d e f e n d a n t w a s v" " v

i. !II.J hiirnii. < r.utn.v t o r t i n t e d
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. 11)
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lie triea I L explain to aeienaar.: tnat pari

vvarninq notice marked as a opeectinq a m
M i not

apply

cf the

i izursouo equipme^ 1

'Hng. Tr . I . 16 j, that ne

Then, after i I v I i ri d e f e n a a r i t he
it, otricei
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mission to searci

T

n-

Tr

enicie :

tinted window; haa a^reac\
been free to G O .

I r . r. 26)

wa r i I :i i I y : i o t i c e a n d 11 > i n g t o

defendant

et^. anc receiving

, iul \-

defendant) did not

nave to appear ami that there was no fine involves, 'Hnq.

explain

sedrch

Iher^ was, however, some or*_l l m m a r y Dialogue by

Officer Davis.

tjon

if h e w a s c a r r y i n g a n y

a negative answer requested perI rie oniorcement action for the

oeen completed.

Defendant should have

.nstead officer Davis launched into a:

.

--- -

gator\ conversat K1'

u

criminal aetivit\,

This was clearly police misconduct and it

1r

M ei tn i ir

it detendant was engagea

. :. ^or-

placed the Jourden or. tne State to prove that the consent cviven
was vclnnrnr-

37, 38)

ano v T x

an" no;, an exploitation of the police

mi sconduct.
Officer lavis stated that he had not ofc---"-

or anything there at the vehicle which would indicate a crime
was in progress. (Hng. Tr. P.19)

He further testified that he

had no indication or suspicion of any criminal offense at the
time he gave the warning notice for the tinted windows to
defendant. (Hng. Tr. ?.21)

On further guestioning officer Davis

testified that the numerous air fresheners, empty fast food containers, the vehicle not registered to the driver and a re-welded
section in the bed of the pick-up made him suspicious. (Hng.
Tr. P. 26, P. 27)
Defendant was a 22 year old Mexican national, had lived in
the United States for four years and only understood a little of
what Officer Davis was saying to him.

This was shown by the

prosecutor's guestions and defendant's answers on page 65 of
the hearing transcript:
Q.

How long did you live in St. George?

A.

Three years.

Q.

Do you speaK English?

A.

A little.

Q.

When -- when Trooper Davis asked you to -- if he
could search the truck, you understood what he
was saying, didn't you?

A.

Just a little.

Q.

Why did you tell him yes?

A.

Because I understand only a little.

That's why.

Officer Davis was an experienced police officer, having
been with the Utah Highway Patrol for 13 years and 9 months.

The patrolman's offer to no I i , f he
nuii':»j lit.itecij i-l

n u n i • < »l

u 1

,, * r JM n .j

i ticket requiring an appearance, the explan-

ation that two of trie checKec
not apply to def enaant , thV

items

on t no warnirn not::-' aia

«i f
» f ^n n --" * tonl i in I 1J j .

•

appear

or pay a fine and finally the query of what defendant was carrying 11 I the pick-up constituted a subtle but coercive approach
or foundation for ti ie patro 1 mai i 's questior i - Cai i I search the
truck,1

Defendant uas in .-. dilemma.

He could hardly answer 'no'

after ne nac lust tola the officer that he was carrying no guns,
knives, aioonnl

"'nr.rapan: n : unv .:ma or anytning liKe that.

Black's Law Dictionary

- Thirc Idition defines coercion as

"compulsion or force
mav re either actual (direct
or positive) or implied
(legal or constructive) wnere
the relation of the parties is such that one is under
subjection to the other, and is thereby constrained to
do what his free will would refuse.'
in State vs. Robinson

'797 P2d. 431) a Utah 1^"' ^tise in-

volving u routine f :u:":ic violation stop for abruptly polling
in front of a highway patrolman traveling in the same direction
the Court of Appeals stated:
M

* ": * An officer conducting a routine traffic stop
may request a driver's license and vehicle registration, conduct a computer check, and issue a citation.
(United States v. Guzman), 864 F.2d 1512, 1519
(10th Cir.1988). However, once the driver has produced a valid license and evidence of entitlement to
use the vehicle, "he must be allowed to proceed on
his way, without being subject to further delay by
police for additional questioning" _I_d . Any further
temporary detention for investigative questioning
after the fulfillment of the purpose for the initial
traffic stop is rust ified under the fourth amendment

only if the detaining officer has a reasonable suspicion of serious criminal activity. * * * The detaining officers must be able to articulate a particularized and objective basis for their suspicions
that is drawn from the totality of circumstances
facing them at the time of the seizure. United
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18, 101 S.Ct.
690, 694-95, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981); see State
v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah) 1987)
In the Robinson case the van used by the defendants was owned
by and registered to Robinson's employer.

While questioning the

defendants the two patrol officers noticed a nervousness on one
of the defendants, a built up bed in the carpeted back of the
van, a lack of cold weather clothing after defendants had informed the officers that they were going on a fishing trip in
Wyoming with some friends.

The officers decided to ask permission

to search the van and after giving the warning citation for the
improper lane change asked the defendants if they were carrying
any weapons, large sums of money, or narcotics.

They both said

"no" and trooper Garcia asked them if they could make a search
of the van.

According to the troopers defendant Robinson verbally

agreed to the search took the keys from the ignition and opened
the van's rear doors.

The officers wanted to search in a closed

compartment under the built-up bed and finally, after a threat to
impound the van and obtain a search warrant permission was given
for a dog to go through the van.

Defendants were arrested after

the dog gave a positive alert and the officers found eight duffel
bags of marijuana in the space under the bed's platform.

The

court stated that the officers did not have a reasonable suspicion
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of car theft or other

-rjnuii

< i i me ouiip'ient :o lustify the

routloide detention an:: questioning

that followed and stated:

"
In sun,, we conclude chat the trial court clearly
erred in its finding that the troopers had the reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity necessary to justify their
continued detention and questioning of P o b m s o n and Tower;
once the warning citation was given and the purposes for
the initial stop had been accomplished.
Defendants"
detention after tnat point was, therefore, a violatirif
of their fourth amendment rights."
Ine ..tat- 'jcr.tenri' ^ tnat t;ie m^1
- ~- r

• •

* •

::

.. . J:. : t i tut i ona 1 :e:ei:::.:, cecause Rocuisc:

;:onsento .• to t:t•_* warrantless sear:
.Vu lector' dotern.rn t no trio.
.Lo-it -^ ^ sear en
i^ lawtuiiy o o t a m e u toi^owirig edict 1 action that violates
tne fourth amendment, such as the unlawful detention tert
\l]
tnt_ consent must be voluntary in fact; ^nc _
tnconsent must not ro attained bv police exploitation . f
the prior illegality. Arroyo, T9r- i ..a 684. hotr. ie:t,
must ot met in order for evidenc- obtained in searches
fcllovir.: to 1 ice -lieaaiitv to ce admissible. Id.
* I n exam:._:.'_: ^ _ t:.-_ cut t _. un^. . n^ .. ,: cams tances
tt aetermm* . :' _n fact trie consent to search was coercec
. court must tart int. m c o u n t ootn tn- details of pci.Ct
conduct and tne characteristics of tne accused, Arroyo,
796 ?.2d at 6~— void: tnciuae "susti' coercive police
questions, as well as tne possible vulnerao^^ subjective state of the o c r s c w:i- consent . '
'' * + * I n 1 i ah t :
auct, trie coercive
that tne State nas
p
o b m s : - 't tenser*-

: t nr tree oer s • au^s t i on i n t anc tci atmospnere at tne time., «-;-- concmcnot borne its buraen of proving that
to searct tn-* ver.y.t-' waf v Luntary".

.n commonwealth vs.

:

tiroes

22" *

•-

.' ~

opened a shaving kit fell out and the officer asked "what is that?"
Appellant stated it was his shaving kit and unzipped the top, exposing its contents and one of the officers observed a number of
vials; one of which contained marijuana.

Appellant was arrested,

given his Miranda warning, a search warrant was obtained to
search the car and ten kilos of marijuana were uncovered.

The

court dealt with the consent of appellant by opening the car
door and unzipping the shaving kit when the officer asked what
it was.

Among other things the court stated:

" * * * Since consent to an otherwise illegal search involves a waiver of the right to be free from such searches, the consent in question must meet the test of constitutional waiver. * * * That is, the waiver must meet
two requirements: it must be 1) voluntary, and 2) intelligent, (cases cited)
11

Since a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution is involved, a waiver will not lightly be found."
" * * * Consent must be freely given to be effective.
This means there must be a total absence of coercion,
express or implied. * * * Mere acquiescence to the orders
suggestions, or requests of the police can never be equated with consent. (cases cited) * * * Thus, a finding of voluntary consent can never rest solely on the
fact that an accused did some consensual act or gave permission to the police to search, but is a question of
fact which must be decided in light of the circumstances
attending the alleged consent.(Citation)
" Among the factors to be considered are the setting in
which the consent was obtained; what was said and done
by the parties present; the age, intelligence and educational background of the person consenting."
"* * * Added to these elements indicating involuntariness,
is the fact that appellant did not understand English very
well. * * * While this factor would seem more appropriately
discussed in an analysis of the intelligence of the consent, it is an appropriate inquiry here because "under
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many circumstances a reasonable person might read an
officer's (polite request) as a courteous expression
of a demand backed by force of law. (case cited)
Thus, a person without a facility in the English language might understand a request, however phrased,
to be an order and thus merely acquiesce, rather than
voluntarily consent to the request.
In State v. Arroyo, "96 P.2d 684 (1990)

the Utah Supreme

Court reviewed a decision of the Court of Appeals on the same
case reported in 770 P.2d 153 (1989; because the case presented
important issues concerning the effect of consent searches amd
pretextual traffic stops under the fourth amendment

After a

fairly exhaustive review cf leading cases from Utah and other
states the court stated:
•• * * * Two factors determine whether consent to a
search is lawfully obtained following initial police
misconduct. The inquiry should focus on whether the
consent was voluntary and whether the consent was obtained by police exploitation of the prior illegality.
Evidence obtained in searches following police illegality must meet both tests to be admissible.
The case law holds that a consent which is not voluntarily given is invalid, (cases cited) * * *
Generally, whether the requisite voluntariness exists
depends on "the totality of all the surrounding circumstances—both the characteristics of the accused
and the details of police conduct, (cases cited)
A second factor is whether consent was obtained
tnrough police exploitation of the primary or antecedent police illegality.
The court cited Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, as an example cf the application of the second part of the two part test
In Royer, a suspect who matched a drug courier profile was detained at an airport by two police officers who requested and re
tained the suspect's airline ticket and driver's license.

The

officers asked Royer to accompany them to a room in the airport.
The officers retrieved Rover's luggage from the airline and obtained Rover's consent to open and search the luggage.
search uncovered narcotics.

The

The trial court subsequently found

that Royer's consent was "freely and voluntarily given" and therefore denied a suppression motion.

The Supreme Court held that the

detention of Royer constituted an illegal seizure. 460 U.S. 507.
Without questioning the assertion that Royer's consent was "freely
and voluntarily given" the plurality opinion concluded that "the
consent was tainted by the illegality and was ineffective to justify the search." 460 U.S. at 507-08.

Thus, the exploitation of

illegality of the detention was the determinative factor, despite
the voluntariness of the consent.
The court also cited People v. Odom, 404 N.E. 2d 997 (1980)
which stated"
"* * * However, a finding that the defendant's consent
to search was voluntarily given is but one step in the
determination of the propriety of the search, because
even if the consent were voluntary it still may have
been obtained by the exploitation of an illegal arrest
.... Therefore the question before us is whether Odom's
consent was obtained by the exploitation of an illegal
arrest, or "by means sufficiently distinguishable to
be purged of the primary taint."
Finally the court dealt with the scope of consent and stated:
" Finally, a search supported by voluntary consent
which is not an exploitation of the primary illegality
may still be found invalid if the search exceeds the
scope of the consent.
" * * * Assuming . . . that a general and unqualified
consent was given, then the boundaries of the place
referred to mark the outer physical limits of the
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authorized search. Even within these limits, however,
the police do not have carte blanche to do whatever
they please. Certainly they may not engage in search
activity which involves the destruction of property,
and this would seem to bar breaking into locked containers. (Citations) * * * A general consent to
search . . . would not . . . sanction . . .the tearing
down of walls . . . "
In a recent case of State v. Carter, 162 Utah Adv. Rep.32
The Court of Appeals has applied the two-part test to determine
the validity of consent for a search following a police unlawful
detainment.

In this case two narcotic officers in plain clothes

noticed defendant as he carried a duffel bag deplaning from a
flight at the Salt Lake City Airport.

After observing him for a

short time one of the officers approached him, identified himself as a police officer and asked to see his plane ticket and to
show some identification.

As defendant was bent over looking for

some identification in his duffel bag the officer noticed a line
proceeding from defendant's shirt and after identifying himself
as a narcotics officer asked permission to search defendant's bag
and the other officer asked permission to search his person.
fendant responded "go ahead".

De-

During the pat-down search a bulge

and tape were detected and after a request to see the bulge and
tape and moving inside to a room in the airport the defendant
stated "you've got me, you might as well have this11, revealing
the package on his lower abdomen which contained cocaine.
The trial court held that at the time the encounter advanced
to the point where the defendant did not feel free to leave the
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the officers had reasonable suspicion to believe he was transporting drugs and that all searches were pursuant to defendant's voluntary consent.
On appeal the Court of Appeals dealt with

whether there was

reasonable suspicion to detain defendant and whether his consents
to the curbside searches of his person were both voluntary and
sufficiently attenuated from any prior illegality to justify the
searches.

The court reviewed the case law involving the right of

an officer to approach and seize a person as set forth by the
Supreme Court in State v. Deitmer, 739 P2d 616 (1987).
The appellate court agreed with the trial court that there
was no reasonable suspicion to believe defendant was transporting
narcotics at the time the officers conducted a pat-down search of
his person.

Specifically the trial judge had stated:

"1. The Court specifically discredits the officers ability
to form a reasonable articulate suspicion prior to the
time of the defendant's failure to provide an identification upon request.
2. The Court concludes that the absence or the failure
of the defendant to produce identification also was not
by itself, or in the aggregate with the previously listed
factors, sufficient to indicate a reasonable articulable
suspicion.
3. The Court further concludes that the officer's perception
of a line just at or above the defendant's waist, but under his outer clothing, was not a reasonable articulable
suspicion by itself or in combination with anything previously noted.
4. The Court further concludes that the pat down search
and observations made by the officers, including the
feeling of the bulge, at that time was not sufficient
to constitute a reasonable suspicion either alone or
in the aggregate-"

-16-

Notwithstanding the illegal detainment of defendant the State
contended that defendant's voluntary consent to the pat-down search
purged any prior violation of his fourth amendment rights.

The

court stated that generally a warrantless search is violative of
the fourth amendment but that one of the specific established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause
is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent, citing a Supreme
Court case of Schneckloth v. Bustamonte and two Utah cases, Arroyo
and Marshall.

The court stated:

" In determining whether a consent to search is lawfully obtained following a fourth amendment violation,
a two prong test must be met for the evidence to be
admissible: "(1) the consent must be voluntary in
fact; and (2) the consent must not be obtained by
police exploitation of the prior illegality."
11

* * * Even where the government proves the consent
is voluntary, such consent cannot justify a search
if the otherwise voluntary consent was obtained
through the exploitation of an antecedent police
illegality. Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 690-91. Thus, if
an antecedent police illegality exists, the government must establish that the otherwise voluntary
consent is sufficiently attenuated to have purged
the taint of the original police illegality. Id. "
" ^ n Arroyo, the Utah Supreme Court recognized
several factors that merit consideration when determining if consent was obtained as a result of
an exploitation of a prior illegality. These factors include Miranda warnings, temporal proximity
of the illegality and the consent, the presence of
intervening circumstances, and the flagrancy of
the illegality. "
" * * * The undisputed facts in the record establish
that the consensual search which resulted in the ultimate discovery of the drugs occurred immediately
after an illegal seizure. Defendant had been previously seized without reasonable suspicion at the
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time he was requested to permit the pat-down search.
Subsequently, he consented to and raised his shirt
displaying the tape around his middle. There were
no Miranda warnings, or other intervening circumstances documented in the record between the time
of his illegal seizure, and the ultimate consensual
search when he lifted his shirt revealing the tape
which led to the discovery of the contraband. On
the uncontroverted facts in the record before us,
we conclude that defendant's consent first to the
pat-down search and then to lifting his arms to
allow the officer to see the taped packages he had
previously felt during the pat-dowm search was
tainted by his prior illegal seizure as a matter
of law and, therefore, that the contraband should
have been suppressed.11
In the instant case the testimony of officer Davis was that
after he asked if they (defendant and his passenger) needed any
help they got back in their pick-up and attempted to leave.

He

then noticed the vehicle had tinted windows and asked defendant
for his driver's license and vehicle registration as he intended
to write him a warning citation. (Hng. Tr.P8)
On re-direct examination by the prosecutor officer Davis
was asked:
f,

Q.

A.

After you handed the citation to the defendants,
were they free to go? (Hng. Tr. P38)
No, I was going to ask them if I could search the
vehicle. And then if they would have said no,
they would have been free to leave." (Hng. Tr. P38)

On re-cross examination the following conversation took place:
"Q.

Did you tell them that?

A.

No, I did not.

Q.

Did you read their Miranda rights to them or explain
to them any rights that they may have?

A.

No, I did not.

Q.

That was not done at any time prior to the search;
is that correct?

A.

\'o it was not. "

Trooper Davis' statement that appellant would have been free
to go if he had refused to give his consent for the search of the
pick-up seems unlikely but it supports appellant's contention that
the officer had no reasonable basis or articulable suspicion to
justify the detention of defendant even long enough for the query
of what was being carried in the vehicle which led to the request
to search.
Given the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
request to search; the age, education and background of defendant,
the experience of officer Davis and the setting in which the request to search was made indicate that the consent to search was
not voluntary nor free from coercion and/or duress.

After com-

pleting the enforcement action for the tinted windows Officer Davis
launched on an investigation of a more serious crime.

From the re-

cord and considering all the circumstances it would be difficult to
assume that defendant understood the significance of trooper Davis'
request to search the vehicle, the scope of the search, that another
officer would assist in the search, that a screwdriver or tools
would be used to dismantle equipment.

To what extent would the

searching officers have continued had they not found the small bag
of purported cocaine inside the speaker?
The State failed its burden to prove that defendant's consent
was voluntary in fact, free from coercion and/or duress and was not
obtained by exploitation of the illegal detention by officer Davis.

VII• CONCLUSION
The detainment of appellant after he received the warning
notice for tinted windows was unreasonable and was done so that
officer Davis could further question defendant and search his
vehicle in an attempt to discover evidence of a more serious crime.
The detainment, questioning and resulting search cf defendant's
vehicle violated his guaranteed constitutional rights and the evidence obtained during that search should be held inadmissible.
Appellant seeks a reversal of the trial court's denial of
his motion to suppress and a reversal of his conviction.
DATED this

/ <£

day of October, 1991.
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ADDENDUM
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND FINDINGS OF FACT PERTINENT TO CASE
Fourth Amendment, United States Constitution
(Unreasonable searches and seizures.) The right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the persons or things to be seized.
Article I, Section 14, Utah State Constitution
(Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of Warrant)
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall
issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the person or thing to be seized.
Findings of Trial Court at Hearing to Suppress Evidence
No. 3. That the defendant was not in custody nor
had he been restrained in any way or unreasonably detained by the officer at the time the consent was given.
•

•

*

No. 6. That the defendant understood the officer
when he reguested permission to search the vehicle, and
consent was knowingly and voluntarily given.

